KILLING IN THE NAME OF GOD:
OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA
Jerrold M. Post, M.D.[i]
What manner of men are these, living in American society, for years in some cases, aiming to kill thousands while dying in the process? Surely, one would think, they must be crazed psychotics; no normal person could do such a thing. But in fact, the al Qaeda terrorists were psychologically “normal.” By no means were they psychologically disturbed. Indeed, terrorist groups expel emotionally disturbed individuals—they are a security risk.
In many ways, these new terrorists shatter the profile of
suicidal terrorists developed in
The values communicated to the recruits by the commanders are revealed in their answers to questions posed in a series of interviews of 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists, who agreed to be interviewed in Israeli and Palestinian prisons. Twenty of the terrorists belonged to radical Islamic terrorist groups—Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. The psychologically oriented interviews attempted to understand the life history socialization, and recruitment. They were asked to explain their attitudes towards suicide, which the Koran proscribes, and whether they had any moral red lines in terms of numbers of casualties and extent of destruction. Their answers are revealing.
One interviewed terrorist took umbrage at the term “suicide.” “This is not suicide. Suicide is selfish, reflects mental weakness. This is istishad” (martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah.)
One of the commanders interviewed was Hassan Salame, commander of the suicide bombers who carried out the wave of bombing in 1996 that precipitated the defeat of Prime Minister Shimon Peres and the election of Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu. Forty-six Israelis died in the bombings. Salame is sentenced to 46 consecutive life sentences. Concerning suicidal terrorism, he said: “A suicide bombing is the highest level of jihad, and highlights the depth of our faith. The bombers are holy fighters who carry out one of the more important articles of faith.” Another commander asserted: “It is suicide attacks which earn the most respect and elevate the bombers to the highest possible level of martyrdom.”
Asked how they could justify murdering innocent victims, another interview subject bridled: “I am not a murderer. A murderer is someone with a psychological problem; armed actions have a goal. Even if civilians are killed, it not because we like it or are blood thirsty. It is a fact of life in a people’s struggle-the group doesn’t do it because it wants to kill civilians, but because the jihad must go on. “
Asked whether there were any moral red lines, another leader responded: “The more an attack hurts the enemy, the more important it is. That is the measure. The mass killings, especially the suicide bombings, were the biggest threat to the Israeli public and so most effort was devoted to these. The extent of the damage and the number of casualties are of primary importance. In a jihad, there are no red lines. “
The attitudes reflected in these statements characterize the
ethos of radical Islamic terrorism. But
there is a striking contrast between the Israeli suicide bombers and the
nineteen terrorists who carried out the attacks of September 11, an
unprecedented act of mass casualty terrorism. They had lived in western
society, in some cases for many years, exposed to its freedoms and
opportunities. The leaders were
older, in their mid-thirties and late twenties, and a number had received
higher education. Mohammed Atta, the
apparent ringleader, was thirty-three.
Atta and two other hijackers had been received graduate training at the
technological university in
As I have come to understand them, the al Qaeda suicidal
sky-jackers terrorists differ strikingly from the suicide bombers in
Osama bin Laden: A Political Personality Profile
What matter of man can inspire such acts? How could the son of a multi-billionaire
construction magnate in
Osama bin Laden was born in
Osama was the only child of Mohammed and the least favorite of Mohammed’s ten wives, Hamida, a Syrian woman of Palestinian descent.[iv] Hamida was reportedly a beautiful woman with a free and independent spirit who, as a result, often found herself in conflict with her husband. Reportedly by the time Osama was born, Hamida had been ostracized by the family and had been nicknamed “Al Abeda” (the slave). As her only child, Osama was referred to as “Ibn Al Abeda” (son of the slave). Unlike the other bin Laden children who had natural allies in their immediate circle of siblings, Osama and his mother had no such natural allies in the family and as a consequence there may have been a defensive alliance between Osama and his mother against the larger family which treated “the slave and the son of the slave” with contempt. This familial exclusion was perhaps the basis of Osama bin Laden’s later estrangement from his family. Reports are inconsistent as to how much of a presence Hamida was in her son’s life during his early developmental years [v], but it is clear that Mohamed bin Laden divorced Hamid prior to his death in 1967, when Osama bin Laden was ten years old.
Osama bin Laden attended
An important influence on Osama bin Laden’s political
ideology was Abdullah Azzam, a radical Palestinian professor at the university
who became an important intellectual mentor for bin Laden. It was Azzam, a noted Islamist, who provided
the vision to bin Laden of what should be done in response to the invasion of
the Muslim state of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and what role bin Laden
could play. In particular, he conveyed to bin Laden the importance of bringing
together Muslims from around the world to defend
A leader is not formed until he encounters his followers,
and bin Laden’s leadership experience during the struggle in
Bin Laden had not yet broken with the Saudi government,
which after all was the main foundation of his family’s wealth. But he had
successfully vanquished one of the three major enemies identified by Muhammad
Abdel Salam Farag, who
wrote The Neglected Duty: The
Bin Laden came to see the Soviet super-power as a “paper
tiger” that could be defeated, but also set his sights on the remaining
With the victory in
While bin Laden was committed to the international struggle,
Abdullah Azzam believed in focusing all efforts on building
With the defeat of the
Moreover, bin Laden
actively criticized the Saudi royal family for their apostasy, decrying
their defiling their stewardship of the land of the two cities,
In the October 1996 Declaration of War, bin Laden justified his aggression as defensive aggression, asserting that the Islamic nation was under attack.
...The people of Islam had
suffered from aggression, inequality and injustice imposed on them by the
Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators to the extent that Muslims’
blood became the cheapest and their wealth looted in the hands of enemies. Their blood has spilled in
With this, bin Laden and Zawahiri, who is widely believed to
be bin Laden’s pen, justified defensive jihad, while blaming the
Zionist-Crusader alliance for every fight against Muslims. But the fourth
jihad, the jihad of the sword, is a defensive jihad only, that is against those
who take up arms against Muslims. In 1996, the target was only the American
In 1998, a major expansion of the mission occurred, with the
“Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and
Crusaders” in which all Americans, civilian and military were declared to be
the enemy, the civilians because they supported anti-Muslim
World Islamic Front Statement (February 1998 Fatwa)
In compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, "and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together," and "fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God."
We -- with God's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.
The ideological and philosophical underpinnings of al Qaeda
can be found in several important documents.
During my service as expert witness in the spring 2001 trial of Osama
bin Laden terrorists convicted for the bombings of the
This is an altogether remarkable document. On the one hand, it resembles nothing more than a basic tradecraft-training manual, concerned with how to operate in a hostile environment. There are detailed instructions on everything from ciphers to how to resist interrogation. But it is also a manual of terror, with no less than three of the eighteen lessons (chapters) devoted to techniques for assassination.
But it is not merely a list of instructions, for it is also written to inspire the undercover operator as he carries on his dangerous work. And the language at times is quite eloquent. The document reflects a sophisticated approach on the part of al Qaeda operational officials, for there is a continuing emphasis on lessons learned. Many of the chapters cite previous mistakes, which provide the basis for the points emphasized in the lesson. And they do not learn lessons only from their past mistakes, but from adversaries as well. In one section, they cite the astute observational skill of an Israeli Mossad counter-espionage agent who foiled a terrorist plot, and cite Soviet KGB sources in others. Thus the manual reflects the adaptive learning of the organization, and the care with which al Qaeda prepares its operatives. No detail is too small, as exemplified by the instruction in lesson eight, which is concerned with Member Safety, “Do not park in no parking zones.”
Many of the instructions are accompanied by elaborate justification, citing suras (verses) from the Koran, scholars who have provided commentary on the Koran, or hadiths (tradition). These elaborate justifications are offered especially when the instructions recommended seem to contradict Islamic teaching. In this text, the suras are not numbered, and while some are fairly well known, others are more obscure. Similarly, the sources of some of the hadiths are given, while the sources of others are not identified. The authenticity of many of the suras and hadiths is questionable, and several of the suras are taken out of context. For the Islamic youth taught to respect without questioning religious scholars, these can provide apparently persuasive religious authority justifying acts of violence. As Daniel Brumberg[xi] sagely notes, in evaluating the authenticity of the sources, sura 3, 78, which speaks to Christians and Muslims, seems most aptly to apply to the writers of this manual.
There are among them (People of the Book)
A section who distort
The Book with their tongues
(As they read the Book) you would think
It is part of the Book
But it is not part
Of the Book: and they say
“That is from Allah,”
But it is not from Allah:
It is they who tell
A lie against Allah
And (well) they know it.
This document goes a long way towards explaining how the
September 11 hijackers were able to
maintain their cover, in the
1. Have a general appearance that does not indicate Islamic orientation (beard, toothpick, book, (long) shirt, small Koran)
2. Be careful not to mention the brother’s common expressions or show their behaviors (special praying appearance, “may Allah reward you”, “peace be on you”, while arriving and departing, etc)
3. Avoid visiting famous Islamic places (mosques, libraries, Islamic fairs, etc.)
The explanation offered to “An Important Question: How can a Muslim spy live among enemies if he maintains his Islamic characteristics? How can he perform his duties to Allah and not want to appear Muslim?” in lesson eleven is compelling.
“Concerning the issue of clothing and appearance ( of true religion), Ibn Taimia – may Allah have mercy on him – said, “If a Muslim is in a combat or godless area, he is not obligated to have a different appearance from (those around him). The )Muslim) man may prefer or even be obligated to look like them, provided his actions brings a religious benefit…Resembling the polytheist in religious appearance is a kind of “necessity permits the forbidden” even though they (forbidden acts) are basically prohibited.” Citing verses from the Koran, the instruction in effect says that Allah will forgive you for not living the life of a good Muslim, for it is in the service of Allah, in the service of jihad.
An interesting example of the manner in which episodes in the life of the prophet are employed to justify acts which Muslim tradition forbids is found in the section “Justification for Beating and Killing Hostages” in lesson eleven.
“Religious scholars have permitted beating. (The handbook provides an example from the life of the prophet. ) The prophet – Allah bless and keep him – who was praying, started to depart saying, “Strike him if he tells you the truth and release him if he lies.” Then he said, “That is the death of someone (the hostage).” In this tradition, we find permission to interrogate the hostage for the purpose of obtaining information. It is permitted to strike the non-believer who has no covenant until he reveals the news, information and secrets of his people. The religious scholars have also permitted the killing of a hostage if he insists on withholding information from Moslems. The permitted his killing so that he would not inform his people of what he learned about the Muslim condition, number and secrets. In the Honein attack, after one of the spies learned about the Muslims kindness and weakness then fled, the prophet – Allah bless and keep him – permitted (shedding) his blood and said, “Find and kill him.”
The reference to religious scholars as the authoritative
source is to be noted. These scholars “use a tradition” (i.e. a hadith) from Imam Mosallem, who
in turn quotes Thabit Ibn Ans, probably a companion of the Prophet. The discussion is
in the wake of the battle of Badr, in which a black
slave was taken hostage, and apparently beaten on the orders of the Prophet
himself. During the battle of Badr, there were two targets, one a line of traders with a wide variety of goods,
led by Abu Sayfan coming from
There is, it should be emphasized, no reference in any of the relevant suras in the Koran (for example sura 8, 5-19, that Mohammad gave his permission to beat or to kill hostages. Rather the key point is that the victory came only from Allah who (sura 9) provided “a thousand angels” and, as in sura 10, “there is no help except from Allah.” Thus the battle is used as a parable to signify man’s dependence on God, not to justify beating and killing hostages. Once again, by lifting the story of the battle out of context, the authors have misused religious stories and verses to provide justification for their goals. Furthermore, there is no reference in the Koran to the actions or statements attributed to Muhammad, although what the hadith claims may be accurate. But it is possible this story of the action and command of the Prophet was created to be persuasive. Indeed, the cold order attributed to the Prophet to “Find and kill him” is in jarring contrast to the image of the Prophet stressing mercy and compassion found throughout the Koran.
The assertion that the Prophet says, “Islam is supreme and there is nothing above it” can not be found in the Koran. The singular in the statement is discordant with many suras in the Koran, which while advancing the truth of Islam, do not imply that Islam is superior, nor are they meant to suggest that previous religions were intrinsically untrue.
In a more disturbing section of the training manual, the authors outline the “Characteristics of Members that Specialize in the Special Tactical Operations.” Among the various characteristics listed are:
§ Individual’s physical and combat fitness (jumping, climbing, running, etc.)
§ Good training on the weapon of assassination, assault, kidnapping, and bombing (special operations); Possessing cleverness, canniness and deception
§ Possessing intelligence, precision and alertness
§ Tranquility and calm personality (that allows coping with psychological trauma such as those of the operation of bloodshed, mass murder.) Likewise, (the ability to withstand) reverse psychological traumas, such as killing one or all members of his group. (He should be able) to proceed with the work with calmness and equanimity.
These characteristics resemble those of the stated requirements for members in general, but with some refinements. The member in general shall have a calm and unflappable personality that can tolerate murder. While the special operations member, according to the last point, shall not only be calm in the face of mass murder but must be able to kill “one or all members of his group,” and to do this with calmness and equanimity – surely a description of a psychopathic personality.
The training manual’s dedication provides perhaps one of the best insights into the al Qaeda leadership’s view of their struggle:
In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate
To those champions who avowed the truth day and night ...
... And wrote with their blood and sufferings these phrases ...
-*- The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates ..., Platonic ideals ..., nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.
Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been
by pen and gun
by word and bullet
by tongue and teeth
The literary quality and rhetorical force of this dedication is striking. Socratic debates, Platonic ideals, Aristotelian diplomacy—characteristics of a democracy—are dramatically contrasted with the absolutist, uncompromising nature of the confrontation with apostate regimes, referring to the moderate modernizing Islamic nations, who have strayed from the Islamist path, who will know only “the dialogue of the bullet, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun.”
The three dangling last lines, in their pairing of qualities responsible for the establishment of Islamic governments pair words connoting violence (gun, bullet, teeth) with words reflecting persuasive rhetoric (pen, word, tongue.) Powerful rhetoric is highly valued in Arab leaders, and a notable aspect of Osama bin Laden’s leadership is his capacity to use words to justify and to inspire.
Al Qaeda is unique among terrorist organizations in its organization and structure. Perhaps reflecting his training in business management, bin Laden in effect serves as chairman of the board of a holding company (“Radical Islam, Inc.”), a loose umbrella organization of semi-autonomous terrorist groups and organizations with bin Laden providing guidance, coordination, and financial and logistical facilitation.
Unlike other charismatically led organizations, such as
Guzman’s Sendero Luminosa (Shinning Path) of Peru, or Ocalan’s
terrorist PKK (Kurdistan’s Workers Party) of Turkey, both of which were
mortally wounded when their leader was captured, bin Laden has established a
system by which designated successors are seamlessly promoted into open
al-Zawahiri has been designated as bin Laden’s successor and number two. A
leading Islamic militant, Zawahiri is a physician who founded the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad and the new faction, Talaa’al al Fateh (Vanguard of Conquerors.) It was Zawahiri’s
group that responsible for the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak of
Conceptually, al Qaeda differs significantly from other terrorist groups and organizations in its structural composition. Unprecedented in its transnational nature, al Qaeda has proved a challenge to law enforcement officials – it’s organizational structure, diffuse nature, broad based ethnic composition, emphasis on training, expansive financial network and its technological and military capabilities makes it not only a formidable force but difficult to detect.
Al Qaeda was reorganized in 1998 to enable the organization to more
effectively manage its assets and pursue its goals. Gunaratna has characterized the revamped al
Qaeda structure as having four distinct but interconnected elements: a pyramidal structure to facilitate strategic
and tactical direction; a global terrorist network; a base force of guerrilla
It is believed that bin Laden himself oversees the Business Committee, which has developed and continues to oversee al Qaeda’s extensive and sophisticated global financial resources. The committee, comprised of professional bankers, financiers and accountants coordinates the vast financial empire of al Qaeda including legitimate institutions such as state and privately funded charities, banks and companies, as well as more clandestine entities. Although Gunaratna claims that many estimates of al Qaeda’s funding for external operations have been exaggerated, he does place the annual budget of al Qaeda around $50 million.[xii] Despite efforts by the international law enforcement community, al Qaeda’s financial network appears to remain strong.
Ayman Al Zawahiri is believed to head the Islamic Studies Committee. Comprised of various Islamic scholars and religious clerics, this committee issues the organization’s Fatwas and other official writings. Although less has been written about this committee, they are clearly crucial to maintaining and generating the support of the masses of followers who subscribe to the organization’s ideology.
The military committee, responsible for recruiting, training
and operations is clearly one of the most powerful committees within the al
Qaeda organization. Prior to his death
in the fall of 2001 during the conflict in
Al Qaeda also maintains its own guerrilla army, known as the
55th Brigade, an elite body trained in small unit tactics. This group, comprised of approximately 2,000
fighters, was reportedly the “shock troops” of the Taliban, having been
integrated into their army from 1997-2001.[xiii] These elite fighters came from Arab states
such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and others, Central Asian states such as
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyztan and Kazakhstan, and
Asian and Southeast Asian states, primarily Pakistan, Bangladesh, the
Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Most of the members had fought in either the Soviet/Afghan war or other
regional conflicts including in
Al Qaeda’s global network consists of permanent or
independently operating semi-permanent cells of al Qaeda trained militants
established in over seventy-six countries world wide as well as allied Islamist
military and political groups globally.[xv] The strict adherence to a cell structure has
allowed al Qaeda to maintain an impressively high degree of secrecy and
security. These cells are independent of
other local groups al Qaeda may be aligned with, and range in size from two to
fifteen members. Al Qaeda cells are
often used as support for terrorist acts.
Moreover, as was the case with the al Qaeda bombings in
Al Qaeda’s approach of allying itself with various existing
terrorist groups around the world enhances the organizations transnational
reach. Al Qaeda has worked to establish
relationships with diverse groups – not only geographically diverse but they
have also developed working relationships with organizations, such as Hezballah and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), that do not necessarily follow the strict al
Qaeda version of Salafi/Sunni Islam. According to Gunaratna, al Qaeda established
relationships with at least thirty Islamist terrorist groups, including such
well known groups as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Harakat ul-Ansar (Pakistan); Al-Ittihad
(Somalia); Islamic Jihad & Hamas (Palestine); and Al Gama`a
al-Islamiya (Egypt). In addition to its primary logistical base in
Having maintained bases in
Like many terrorist organizations, al Qaeda does not have a formal recruitment strategy, rather it relies on familial ties and relationships, spotters in mosques who identify potential recruits and the volunteering of many members. Al Qaeda members recruit from their own family and national/social groups, and once trained these members are often reintegrated into their own communities. Very similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, the concept of “brotherhood” draws on the concept that familial ties in the Islamic world are binding. Al Qaeda members refer to each other as “brother” and tend to view the organization as their extended family.
Al Qaeda training camps have trained both formal al Qaeda members as well as members of Islamist organizations allied with al Qaeda. According to reports, al Qaeda training is broken into essentially three separate courses: Basic Training – training specific to guerrilla war and Islamic Law; Advanced Training – training in the use of explosives, assassination and heavy weapons; and Specialized Training – training in techniques of surveillance and counter-surveillance, forging and adapting identity documents and conducting maritime or vehicle-based suicide attacks.[xviii]
Al Qaeda has developed extensive training materials used in their camps and other training situations. In addition to paramilitary training, a great emphasis is placed on Islamic studies – Islamic law, history and current politics. The extensive training materials produced by al Qaeda, exemplified by the manual discussed at the beginning of this paper, clearly demonstrate al Qaeda’s twin training goals – the indoctrination of recruits in both military and religious studies.
The unique and far reaching transnational nature of al Qaeda
represents one of the greatest threats currently facing the international
security. Following the attacks of
For many al Qaeda followers the fall 2001 attacks in
There are several possible scenarios to
consider for the future of al Qaeda following the September 11 terrorist
attacks and subsequent US-led war in
While President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have taken
pains to clarify that the War on Terrorism is not a war against Muslims, but a
war against terrorism, seeking to frame this as a religious war, bin Laden has
now laid claim to the title of commander-in-chief of the Islamic world,
opposing the commander-in-chief of the Western world, President George W.
Bush. Alienated Arab youth find
resonance in his statements, and see him as a hero. For many al Qaeda followers the fall 2001
[i] Jerrold Post is Professor Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C. He is the co-author of Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred, Yale University Press, 1997.
[ii] There are varying reports about Osama bin
Laden’s exact location within the family, although 17 of 20/25 sons of 52 or 53
children is the most consistent figure available. Example sources include: Dickey, Christopher and Daniel McGinn. “Meet the
Newsweek. Found at: http://www.msnbc.com/news/639250.asp; Dorschner, John,
“Osama bin Laden: The Mastermind of
Terror.” Knight Ridder
noted, there is no single agreed upon figure as to the inheritance of Osama bin
Laden and reports vary. Sources
include: Beyer, Lisa. “The Most Wanted Man in the World.” Time.com.
Found at: http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101010924/wosama.html.
; McFadden, Robert D. “Bin Laden’s Journey From Rich, Pious Boy to
the Mask of Evil. The New York
Times. September 30, 2001.; Dorschner, John. “A Shadowy Empire of Hate was Born of a
[iv] Nearly all reports refer to Osama bin Laden as the only child (or the only son) of his mother with Muhammed bin Laden. Following her divorce, Osama bin Laden’s mother remarried and subsequently started a second family.
[v] While some reports (see Robinson) claim that Muhammed had Hamida removed from the family before Osama turned one-year-old, other reports more consistently note that she was ostracized by the family but do not indicate that her departure from the family (following her divorce with Muhammed) was as early as Robinson indicates.
[vi] While most reports indicate that Osama did indeed obtain his civil engineering certificate and at least start his degree in Business Management, Rohan Gunaratna in his Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, states that contrary to other reports, bin Laden did not study engineering.
Hashim, A. “Usama bin Laden’s” Worldview and Grand
Strategy,” paper presented to conference at
[viii] See Robinson.
[ix] See Gunaratna.
[x] Declaration of War (1) available on the World Wide Webat http://www.msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/199610/19961013.10.html
editor wishes to acknowledge his appreciation of the critical review of the
text by Daniel Blumberg, an expert on radical Islam who is Professor of Government and Middle Eastern
Affairs at of
[xii] Gunaratna, pg 60-63
[xiii] Gunaratna pg 58
[xiv] Gunaratna pg 59
[xv] Countries believed to have active al Qaeda cells include: Britain, France, Germany, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Trinidad & Tobago, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Borneo, Brunei, Nauru, Fiji, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, UAE, West Bank & Gaza, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, South Africa, U.S., Canada, as well as a growing presence in South America. Gunaratna 79
[xvi] Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. Pgs 5-6
[xvii] Gunaratna pg 96
[xviii] Gunaratna pg 72